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INTRODUCTION
Enacted on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) promised sweeping reforms to address the
dramatic rise in American health care costs that continued unchecked
throughout the previous decade.1 These rising costs stemmed from
factors including increasing prices for drugs, medical equipment, and
hospital services.2 Spending for Medicaid, the joint federal and state
program that covers uninsured, low-income Americans, rose 5.3%
annually between 2001 and 2010.3 New York traditionally spends
more money on Medicaid than any other State.4 For example, in
2005, New York5 spent roughly forty-five billion dollars—fifteen
percent of the total spent nationally on Medicaid.6 To control social
health care spending, the ACA promotes the formation of
Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”), or groups of health care
providers that collaborate by pooling resources, information, and
services to generate efficiencies in care delivery while simultaneously
lowering costs.7 New York followed suit in 2014, initiating its
1. See Mike Patton, U.S. Health Care Costs Rise Faster than Inflation, FORBES
(June 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2015/06/29/u-s-health-carecosts-rise-faster-than-inflation/#2dbe7dd06ad2 [https://perma.cc/RCA7-YJ26].
2. See id.
3. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, MEDICAID IN NEW
YORK: THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE TO IMPROVE CARE AND CONTROL
COSTS 6 (2015),
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/health/medicaid_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9KP-66RB].
4. CITIZEN BUDGETS COMM’N, MEDICAID IN NEW YORK: WHY NEW YORK’S
PROGRAM IS THE MOST EXPENSIVE IN THE NATION AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2–3
(2006), http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/reportsummary_medicaid_04202006.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDB-2VHJ].
5. Medicaid is an entitlement program that provides health care for low income
individuals in the United States. See Andy Schneider & Victoria Wachino, Chapter
IV: Medicaid Administration, in THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, 129, 131–33
(2003). The program is jointly operated by the federal and state governments.
Though state participation in Medicaid is optional, every state has opted to
participate. Id. Under Medicaid, states administer programs to provide health care
on a day-to-day basis pursuant to a set of federal guidelines and under the
supervision of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services at the Department of
Health and Human Services. Id. The federal government provides funds that match
state expenditures associated with the costs of providing health services and
administering the program. Id.
6. See CITIZEN BUDGETS COMM’N, supra note 4, at 3.
7. See Cory H. Howard, The Federal Trade Commission and Federal Courts’

Scrutiny of Healthcare Mergers: Do Inflexible Standards and Increased Scrutiny
Stifle the Legislative Intent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?,
18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 67, 84 (2015).
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Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (“DSRIP”) Program,
which, through an agreement with the U.S. Center for Medicaid and
Medicare Services, reinvests approximately eight billion dollars to
promote the creation of Performing Provider Systems.8
A
Performing Provider System (“PPO”) is a form of ACO meant to
improve the quality of care and reduce the costs attributable to
Medicaid.9
However, increased collaboration among competing health care
providers can create antitrust problems, as a PPS is a state-created
cartel.10 Collaborations or combinations among rivals may reduce the
number of competitors in the market and result in increased prices
and reduced alternatives from which consumers may choose.11 To
protect its health care reform efforts from antitrust enforcement, the
New York State Government has given each PPS the option to apply
for a Certificate of Public Advantage (“COPA”). A COPA is a
statutory mechanism that purports to provide certain collaborations
with immunity from private or government actions under the federal
antitrust laws by invoking the state action doctrine.12 The Supreme
Court established the state action doctrine, which protects states’
ability to regulate their markets and displace competition in a manner
inconsistent with the antitrust laws.13 A private entity may raise state
action immunity as a defense to an antitrust claim if (1) it engaged in
anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a “clearly articulated and

8. See David Evans, New York State Health Care—DSRIP, PPSs, COPAs, and
Antitrust “Immunity,” KELLEY DRYE CLIENT ADVISORIES: PUBLICATIONS & BLOGS

(Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/1004
[https://perma.cc/R2W6-ALY4].
9. See Frequently Asked Questions – PPS, NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSP.,
http://www.nyp.org/pps/faq [https://perma.cc/CL4Q-BJZ5]. The members of a PPS
are intended to integrate their health care delivery operations, their budget, their
resources, and their management to foster efficiencies. Id. These efficiencies are
geared towards generating savings specifically for New York’s Medicaid program. Id.
10. See Robin E. Remis, Healthcare and the Federal Antitrust Laws: The
Likelihood of a Harmonious Coexistence, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113,
116 (1996).
11. See id.
12. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.1 (2018).
13. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943) (establishing the state action
doctrine for antitrust immunity); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991) (“Relying on principles of federalism and state
sovereignty, we held that the Sherman Act did not apply to anticompetitive restraints
imposed by the States ‘as an act of government.’”).
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affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition,”14 and
(2) the conduct is actively supervised by the state.15
Although the New York COPA statute purports to provide broad
antitrust immunity, it only vaguely forecasts the specific
anticompetitive conduct and effects that the State will tolerate. As
such, the COPA statute’s substance most likely falls short of
providing a clearly articulated policy as would be required for the
state action doctrine to apply.
Further, it is unclear whether the regime satisfies the requirement
of active state supervision. The COPA framework requires the New
York Department of Health to monitor the providers’ conduct and
empowers the New York Attorney General to withdraw immunity
and challenge conduct it deems outside the State’s intended scope of
collaboration.
However, those remedies may be insufficiently
meaningful. First, the State’s broad terms of review do not provide
clear guidance to participating collaborations, increasing the risk they
engage in anticompetitive, prohibited conduct. Second, state agencies
lack the intermediate power to control and correct the conduct, short
of initiating antitrust enforcement litigation under federal and state
law. Given that an antitrust challenge could threaten the legal
viability of the entire PPS program and the State’s overarching aim of
promoting greater collaboration among health care providers, there
are substantial disincentives for the State to bring an antitrust
challenge against its own program. The State, therefore, may be
inclined to tolerate substantial abuse of the COPA immunity, such as
practices that arguably raise prices in the intermediate timeframe,
before targeting the abuse. Without a meaningful tool to provide
active supervision, and a clearly articulated policy, the state action
doctrine is unlikely to provide immunity to the PPS regime. Without
that immunity, the PPSs are cartels vulnerable to legal challenge.
However, there are several strategies New York might adopt to
increase its success in invoking state action immunity to protect
health care reform. For example, the legislature might amend the
COPA statute to provide clearer guidance on permitted practices. As
it stands, the statute covers an overly broad range of possible
anticompetitive conduct and creates blanket immunity.16 However,
the State can improve its likelihood of satisfying the state action
doctrine’s “clear articulation” requirement if the State specifies the

14. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 (2013).
15. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
16. See infra Section III.B.
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scope of permissible conduct and clarifies the circumstances in which
immunity should apply.17 Additionally, the New York Attorney
General can refine the standards it will apply in reviewing COPA
applications and PPS performance and strengthen its power to
intervene with tailored, remedial action. With a clearer set of
guidelines and the power to control anticompetitive conduct short of
wholesale withdrawal of antitrust immunity, New York’s COPA
program stands a stronger chance of also satisfying the state action
doctrine’s “active supervision” requirement.18
This Note examines the question of whether New York’s attempt
to provide certain health care collaborations with immunity from
federal antitrust laws comports with recent Supreme Court decisions
clarifying the state action doctrine.19 Part I describes New York’s
DSRIP Program and the accompanying COPA immunity framework.
Part II examines the foundations of the ongoing policy debate over
the role of antitrust law in health care reform and the principles of the
state action doctrine as they apply in that context. Part III analyzes
the viability of New York’s COPA immunity under the state action
doctrine. Part IV proposes a number of changes New York might
consider to secure its immunity initiatives.
I. NEW YORK’S DSRIP PROGRAM AND COPA ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY
On April 14, 2014, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that
New York had entered into a Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver
Amendment agreement20 with the U.S. Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.21 This agreement enables New York to reinvest
eight billion dollars in federal savings produced by Medicaid

17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See generally N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015);
Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. 216.
20. See Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012). An Expansion waiver
granted under section 1115 permits individual states to implement the Affordable
Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in ways beyond the scope provided by federal law.
See MaryBeth Musumeci & Rubin Rudowitz, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion
Waivers: Executive Summary, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2015), http://kff.org/
medicaid/issue-brief/the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/B4
DC-RGQU].
21. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces
Final Approval of $8 Billion MRT Waiver to Protect and Transform New York’s
Health Care System (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-announces-final-approval-8-billion-mrt-waiver-protect-and-transform-newyorks [https://perma.cc/85TW-Q36C].
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Redesign Team (“MRT”)22 reforms. Under the MRT Agreement,
reforms will be implemented through the DSRIP Program, which
allows health care providers in a given area who meet certain criteria
to form collaborative units known as Performing Provider Systems or
PPSs.23 Such collaborations are designed to improve care quality and
lower costs through improvement and innovation.24 For example, the
participating health care providers in a qualifying DSRIP PPS would
share resources and information on the provision of medical services
with the aim of providing more efficient, less redundant care in a
given community.25 According to Governor Cuomo, increasing
collaboration among providers will simultaneously improve care
quality while reducing avoidable hospital utilization by up to twentyfive percent over a five-year period.26 The goal of such collaboration
is to reduce the costs ultimately attributable to Medicaid.27
Increased federal funding distributed by the DSRIP Program
serves as the incentive for providers to aggressively pursue
collaborative efficiency.28 To apply for PPS status, providers must
come together, form plans for their collaboration, and apply as a
group. Each prospective PPS must serve a population of at least five
thousand Medicaid members. Medicaid compensation for care
22. Id. Governor Cuomo created the Medicaid Redesign Team “to address
underlying health care cost and quality issues in New York’s Medicaid program,” and
develop a long-term plan for health care reform. See Redesigning the Medicaid

Program: DSRIP and MRT Waiver Amendment Information – About the Medicaid
Redesign Team, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/

health_care/medicaid/redesign/ [https://perma.cc/V335-9DBD].
23. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act empowers states to experiment with
adjustments to their Medicaid programs. See Samantha Artiga, Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid & the Uninsured, Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115
Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 2011), https://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6C8-3DKJ]; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
24. New York State’s $8 Billion Medicaid 1115 Waiver Amendment to Improve
Access, Quality and Efficiency in the State’s Health Care Delivery System, ROPES &
GRAY ALERT (May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Ropes & Gray Alert],
https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2014/May/New-York-States-8-BillionMedicaid-1115-Waiver-Amendment-to-Improve-Access-Quality-and-Efficiency
[https://perma.cc/6RTT-9GFR].
25. See
DSRIP
Overview,
N.Y.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH,
https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/dsrip/overview.htm
[https://perma.cc/69L6-SGAB].
26. See Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24.
27. See DSRIP Overview, supra note 25.
28. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, MRT WAIVER AMENDMENT/DSRIP SPECIAL
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 55–56 (2012), http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/
medicaid/redesign/dsrip/docs/2015-10-01_special_terms_and_conditions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XCJ-EEL7].
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delivery will depend on meeting certain efficiency benchmarks set
and monitored by the State.29 Typically, Medicaid reimburses
providers for services at rates determined by the State.30 The MRT
Agreement terms make the level of funding provided by the federal
government contingent on New York meeting overall performance
goals, and may be reduced if savings and performance benchmarks
are not met.31
Health care providers may be deterred from creating PPSs because
they fear such collaboration with competitors could expose them to
antitrust enforcement. To combat this fear and encourage DSRIP
collaboration, New York offers prospective collaborators the
opportunity to apply for state action immunity under New York
Public Health Law article 92-F (“the COPA statute”).32 Pursuant to
the COPA statute, the New York Department of Health promulgated
regulations to govern the COPA application process, as well as
monitor the PPSs’ performance and competitive effects.33 This
performance review determines the levels of additional funding a PPS
will receive from the State, and also serves to monitor and reevaluate
a PPS’s COPA status. To apply for COPA immunity, the PPS must
submit a copy of the relevant collaboration agreements and a
description of their nature and scope, along with their contractual
terms and other performance data.34 The PPS must also provide
documentation pertaining to the PPS’s financial position and the
present market conditions for regular review.35 The New York
Department of Health, along with the New York Attorney General’s
office review the COPA application according to these terms to
decide whether the State’s policy to encourage innovation is best
served by granting immunity.36

29. See DSRIP Overview, supra note 25, at 42.
30. See Uwe Reinhardt, How do Hospitals Get Paid? A Primer, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX (Jan. 23, 2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/how-dohospitals-get-paid-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/GBM6-BWGH].
31. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 28, at 54–55.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).
33. Evans, supra note 9.
34. See id.
35. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.10 (2018).
36. Id.
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEALTH CARE REFORM AND
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE ROLE OF THE STATE ACTION
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Federal and state efforts to reform the health care landscape reflect
an evolving policy debate about whether the law should treat health
care as a social system or a market entity.37 As costs continued to rise
through the 1990s, policy makers focused on how health care was
delivered and paid for, which prompted a shift towards the view that
systematic collaboration should be emphasized over pure
competition.38 Consequently, antitrust laws have been a source of
tension in health care reform because they are based on the principle
that competition among providers ultimately benefits patients.39 This
section examines the policy debate about how the American health
care system should function in the antitrust context and discusses the
role of New York’s state action immunity statute in this debate.
Although they approach the issue from potentially conflicting
perspectives, both antitrust laws and pro-collaboration reforms are
aimed at exactly the same goal: lowering the cost and improving the
quality of care given to patients. The state action doctrine comes into
play when the two approaches collide. Section II.A provides
background on some recent changes in the American health care
system and discusses the associated policy positions. Section II.B
describes both the enforcement of the antitrust laws in health care
and the role of state action immunity in health care reform efforts.
A. Efficiency and Quality Through Collaboration: The Basis for
Health Care Reform
In the current debate about the nature of health care, one side
approaches the provision of medical services as a market that should
be subject to the forces of competition, while the other treats it as a
social system that functions best in a less competitive environment.40
Supporters of the market paradigm argue that maintaining
competition forces health care providers to continually seek

37. See James F. Blumenstein, Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care
Industry: A Battleground of Competing Paradigms, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 421, 421–22

(2008).
38. See Howard, supra note 7, at 88.
39. See id. at 71.
40. See, e.g., James F. Blumenstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions
of Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 1459, 1459 (1994).
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efficiencies that permit them to offer better services at lower prices.41
Supporters of the social system paradigm argue that health care
differs from other markets in the sense that patients—the key
consumers—are not cost conscious actors.42 Patients, who often lack
knowledge about medical science, technology, and the potential
outcomes of different treatments, are not sufficiently informed to
measure the value of different treatment options.43 Further, patients
typically do not bear the immediate costs of the services they
receive.44 The fact that either insurance companies or government
programs bear these costs, combined with the lack of available cost
comparison information, leaves patients without the motivation or
ability to question a doctor’s recommended treatments, regardless of
the price.45 Providers will often take advantage of this dynamic, for
instance, by charging multiple times for the same service or on an
individually itemized basis, because higher fees result in increased
recoupment.46
These inefficiencies have largely defined the structures used to pay
for health care. For example, inefficiency was prevalent in the “feefor-service” and managed care payment models that pervaded
through the 1980s and 1990s.47 Under the fee-for-service model,
providers billed on an individual basis for each test and procedure
provided and every resource expended, the costs of which were
generally passed on to insurance companies.48 This motivated
providers to extend hospitalizations and exercise less cost discretion
in their treatment.49 The managed care system was intended to
correct these problems by requiring that insurance companies pay for
specific services covered by the policy, rather than individual services
and resources.50 As a result, providers tailored their treatment to the
patient’s insurance cost caps.51 Although managed care slowed the
cost increases in the short term, the providers’ focus shifted to the

See Blumenstein, supra note 37, at 423.
See id. at 427.
See Blumenstein, supra note 40, at 1475.
See Elizabeth L. Rowe, Accountable Care Organizations: How Antitrust Law
Impacts the Evolving Landscape of Health Care, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1855, 1856
41.
42.
43.
44.

(2012).
45. See id. at 1881.
46. See id. at 1858.
47. See id. at 1858–59.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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amount charged rather than the treatment process, which degraded
the quality of care provided.52
Advocates for treating the healthcare industry as a social system
argue that competition among providers exacerbates the problem of
low quality care because it prevents providers from cooperating
efficiently.53 As medical science and technology advanced and
professional specialties improved, individual providers increasingly
lacked the capacity to provide the full array of services that might be
available to treat a given illness. A single patient’s treatment might
be in the hands of multiple providers from competing institutions who
were not predisposed to share information and resources or to fully
cooperate. The resulting redundancies and inefficiencies contributed
to escalating health care costs.54 In contrast, the ACA’s ACO
reforms promote the creation of efficiencies through sharing
information and pooling resources and create financial incentives for
pursuing such efficiencies.55
The theory is that increased
collaboration will foster seamless, integrated care that is focused on
the quality and efficiency of the service, while removing incentives for
redundancy.56
B.

Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care and the Role of the State
Action Doctrine

Increased collaboration among providers can collide with antitrust
laws, which are motivated by the basic assumption that vigorous
competition in the market benefits consumers, and that health care is
not an exception.57 Antitrust enforcement in the health care system
originated when the Supreme Court rejected the previously
established “learned profession exception” to the antitrust laws in its
1975 decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.58 After Goldfarb,
those practicing medicine and providing health care—previously
considered exempt “learned professionals”—were subject to antitrust

52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See Blumenstein, supra note 40, at 1483.
See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1858.

ANN MARIE MARCIARILLE ET AL., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO CREATING
SAFETY-NET ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY ISSUES 2 (2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/FINAL_
assembled_SafetyNetACO.0817-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YS3-745V].
56. Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24.
57. Letter from FTC, to N.Y. Dep’t of Health, Regarding Certificate of Public
Advantage Applications Filed Pursuant to New York Public Health Law,
10 NYCRR, Subpart 83-1, at 3 (Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter FTC Letter].
58. See 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
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regulation.59 Since then, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (together “the
Agencies”) have actively policed the health care system, challenging
mergers and collaborative efforts that they deem anticompetitive.60
The Agencies maintain that mergers, acquisitions, total integration,
and comprehensive collaboration arrangements can reduce the
number of competitors in a given market and increase the
collaboration’s market power. This in turn can create monopolies or
oligopolies, and lead to supra-competitive pricing,61 exclusive dealing,
barriers to the entry of new health care providers, and other practices
that antitrust laws prohibit.62 The threat of enforcement under the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which together regulate
anticompetitive agreements among competitors, monopolization of
markets, and mergers, can chill health care providers’ attempts to
collaborate, especially where collaboration might be interpreted as
potentially consolidating the market or increasing market power.63
Given that New York’s DSRIP Program aims to extend the desired
benefits of collaboration as aggressively as possible, and that antitrust
laws might impede those efforts in geographic markets with already
limited competition, it follows that New York would seek to provide
collaborators with state action immunity. Protection from the threat
of costly and often damaging antitrust litigation frees providers to
vigorously pursue New York’s desired collaborative efficiencies.
The state action doctrine originated in Parker v. Brown,64 in which
the Supreme Court first recognized that states acting in their
sovereign capacity were immune from the antitrust laws.65 The Court
held that neither the Sherman Act’s text nor history suggested that it

59. See id.
60. See Evans, supra note 9.
61. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 702–03 (1975).
Supra-competitive prices are prices that are higher than they would be if they were
subject to competition. Id. Antitrust doctrine rests on the premise that competition
will force rival firms to continually improve their products and sell them at prices that
are at or near the cost of production. Id. This will be the case because firms that
charge prices that are significantly above their costs will lose business to competitors
who charge lower prices for comparable products. Id. When competition is
constrained or eliminated, firms have the power to charge prices well above the cost
of the product. Id.
62. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1861.
63. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); see also Rowe, supra note 44, at 1861.
64. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
65. See id. at 350–53.
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was intended to limit the states’ authority to regulate markets within
their own borders.66 Although antitrust laws represent the national
policy that competition is essential to the “preservation of the free
market and a system of free enterprise,”67 the principles of federalism
dictate that states retain the right to regulate their own economies in
ways that are inconsistent with the value of competition.68 However,
because of the value of competition to free markets, grants of “stateaction immunity [are] disfavored, much as are repeals by
implication.”69 The state action doctrine has continually evolved, and
now provides an affirmative defense for actions taken by private
parties so long as two requirements are met.70 “First, the challenged
restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by the
State itself.”71
The FTC has, unsurprisingly, voiced concerns about New York’s
COPA framework.72 These concerns are twofold. First, the FTC
believes that such a broadly cast immunity is not necessary for DSRIP
PPSs to achieve the desired efficiencies, because the collaboration the
program incentivizes is procompetitive, and will not tend to lessen
competition in the health care market.73
Second, and more
importantly, the FTC fears that this broad grant of immunity will
protect collaboration beyond the scope of DSRIP, and empower
otherwise competing actors to lessen competition that would
otherwise benefit consumers.74 The FTC argues that immunity is
unwarranted because the DSRIP Program aims to streamline health
care delivery, generate efficiencies, cut costs, and improve quality, all
of which are typically considered procompetitive functions, and are
not necessarily antitrust violations.75 According to the FTC’s
understanding, the State does not have to grant immunity to certain
health care providers, because the health care reform objectives can
be met without shielding overtly anticompetitive conduct from

66. See id. at 350–51.
67. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992).
68. See id.; see also FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 223–27
(2013).
69. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
70. See id. at 633.
71. Id. (citing Cal. Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980)).
72. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
73. See id. at 1–3.
74. See id. at 3–5.
75. See id. at 2–4.
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antitrust enforcement.76
The antitrust laws permit firms to
collaborate for efficiency as long as the procompetitive value of the
efficiencies outweighs their anticompetitive effects.77 Therefore, the
antitrust laws would theoretically permit most of the collaborative
conduct PPSs are inclined to pursue, regardless of immunity. By
implication, the only possible remaining conduct gaining
immunization by the DSRIP scheme would be activities that are
especially anticompetitive and pose a substantial threat to the health
care market.78
The FTC illustrated its point in the context of three PPSs that had
applied for COPA protection.79 The three PPSs were all in rural or
otherwise geographically isolated regions with limited competitors in
the health care market.80 Under such conditions, mergers or
cooperative agreements that entail full clinical and financial
integration would consolidate competitors in an already small market.
As such, the PPSs would have a hard time passing muster under the
antitrust laws absent immunity, because they are likely to
unacceptably restrain competition.81
Although the Agencies favor competition as a means of protecting
patients’ interests, they are not deaf to national policy favoring

76. See id.
77. The Sherman Act has been interpreted to prohibit only contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. See generally PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 301 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 4th ed.
2017). Thus, courts tasked with deciding whether a challenged restraint constitutes
and antitrust violation apply the rule of reason. Id. In applying the rule of reason,
courts weigh the challenged restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects,
and determine whether alternative courses of action could produce the desired
procompetitive effects without restraining competition. Id. A restraint is permissible
if it, on balance, creates procompetitive efficiencies that cannot be generated in a less
restrictive means, and the benefits of the procompetitive effects outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. Id.
78. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 5.
79. See id. at 4.
80. The Federal Trade Commission’s Comment Letter to the New York
Department of Health expressed the Bureau of Competition Office of Policy
Planning’s views on the COPA framework generally, but also relayed specific
concerns about three COPA applications that had been filed at that time. These
included the Adirondack Health Institute DSRIP PPS, the Advocate Community
Partners DSRIP PPS, and the Staten Island DSRIP PPS. See id. at 6 nn.2–4.
81. See id. at 5. For background, see generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS (2000); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996).
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collaboration and efficiency.82 The Agencies have issued a series of
guidelines on how they approach and analyze various types of
consolidation and integration in the health care sphere.83 These
guidelines describe what factors the agencies assess and how they
weigh those factors in determining whether conduct should be
challenged. They also establish “safety zones” that set parameters for
collaborations that avoid anticompetitive issues.84 The guidelines,
however, do not account for New York’s desire for these efficiencies
to benefit Medicaid’s system and patients in areas where competition
and collaboration cannot coexist in their fullest forms. In such cases,
New York would prefer to replace competition with collaboration.85
Both New York’s Medicaid policy promoting collaboration and
efficiency and the federal antitrust policy of protecting healthy
competition aim to produce precisely the same end results: higher
quality care at lower costs. However, they are pursuing the same goal
from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. The antitrust
rationale suggests that competition among rivals in health care
markets will force providers to do a better job at the lowest cost.86
New York’s DSRIP rationale, which perceives that higher degrees of
collaboration will improve overall quality and lower costs, seeks to
replace antitrust regulation of the competitive landscape with its own
regulation of collaborative performance.87 The state action doctrine
provides the State with a legitimate means to do so. Yet, as the FTC
has pointed out,88 most of the collaborative conduct in which DSRIP
PPSs engage will not be anticompetitive in nature. Because the range
of potentially concerning conduct is small, there may be regulatory
measures the State might pursue to isolate and control specific
anticompetitive conduct short of blanket immunity.89
III. THE VIABILITY OF NEW YORK’S COPA IMMUNITY EFFORTS
UNDER THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
New York’s attempt to shield certain PPSs with antitrust immunity
reflects its intent to encourage the aggressive pursuit of efficiencies

82. See STATEMENT
supra note 81, at 3.
83. See id. at 1.
84. See id. at 5–6.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

OF

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).

See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1870–71.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa.
FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
See infra Part IV.
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for the benefit of Medicaid’s uninsured and low-income
beneficiaries.90 However, it is unlikely that this effort comports with
the substantive requirements that must be met for the state action
doctrine to protect the actions of private market participants.
Specifically, New York’s COPA statute and its accompanying
regulations neither adequately forecast nor supervise the specific
anticompetitive conduct and effects the State seeks to condone.
Part III discusses the basic aims and parameters of New York’s
COPA program, as compared to the elements of the state action
doctrine, and argues that the State’s efforts do not clearly satisfy
either prong of the analysis.
A. The Implications of New York’s COPA State Action Statute
The COPA framework is intended to facilitate improvements to
Medicaid, but does not specifically account for the competitive effects
experienced by private payors. The DSRIP Program aims to benefit
the Medicaid system, and by extension, its uninsured and low-income
beneficiaries.91 The Medicaid system pays providers state-established
rates for their services, and supplemental funding from the DSRIP
Program depends on whether the PPS achieves its preset performance
and efficiency benchmarks.92 However, the PPSs will still negotiate
rates and fees privately with insurance companies.93
By consolidating the market, a PPS may be able to increase its
market power, which could set the stage for a range of
anticompetitive behavior.94 For example, a PPS in a market with few
competitors could behave as a cartel.95 If the collaborators negotiate
with private payors using a single identity, or negotiate separately
while sharing sensitive operational information, they could maximize
their bargaining power and raise prices to supra-competitive levels.96
Moreover, the PPS could use its market power to deter new providers
According to the Agencies,
from entering the market.97
90. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
91. See Evans, supra note 9.
92. See Reinhardt, supra note 30; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra
note 28, at 55.
93. See Reinhardt, supra note 30.
94. See, e.g., Nicole Harrell Duke, Comment, Hospital Mergers Versus
Consumers: An Antitrust Analysis, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 75, 82 (2000).
95. See, e.g., id. at 82–83.
96. See Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care
Organizations to Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1447
(2012).
97. See id.
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collaborations among even small health care providers can pose
serious antitrust risks because these providers typically operate in
smaller geographic markets with limited numbers of competitors.98
Given these risks, the FTC has indicated that New York’s COPA law
will not discourage it from following its policy of investigating and
challenging hospital collaborations it deems anticompetitive.99 If this
is the case, it is unclear whether New York’s purported protection
from antitrust litigation satisfies the requirements of the state action
doctrine.
As discussed above, antitrust immunity attaches automatically to
actions taken by a state legislature or high court acting in its sovereign
capacity.100 When a private entity or a sub-state entity is acting as a
normal market participant, however, this principle may not apply.101
In order for either a sub-state entity, such as a municipality or state
agency, or a private enterprise acting pursuant to state authority to
invoke state action immunity as an antitrust defense, two conditions
must be met.102 First, “the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.’”103 Second,
the challenged conduct must have been subject to active supervision
by the state.104 The DSRIP PPSs are formed and act pursuant to state
statutory authority and are therefore private entities that must show
both elements to qualify for state action immunity. Thus, for the
COPA statute to provide an affirmative defense in the event of a
challenge, the PPS will have to establish both that the statutory policy
permitting anticompetitive activity is clearly articulated, and that the
authorized anticompetitive conduct is being actively supervised by the
state.105
It is not certain that New York’s COPA immunity will withstand
judicial scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions.
On its face, the COPA statute clearly evinces the State’s intent to
provide blanket immunity from antitrust enforcement. However, one
might argue that the COPA framework in reality sidelines antitrust
laws wholesale, rather than replacing antitrust laws in a specific
98. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
99. Id.
100. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943).
101. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealer’s Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105–06 (1980).
102. See id. at 105.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2015)
(quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105).
105. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988).
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sphere based on the economic merits of competition. Given this
focus, the COPA provisions reflect only that health care providers
should be allowed to collaborate in contravention of the antitrust laws
under certain circumstances, but is not clear as to what these
circumstances are. Although the accompanying COPA regulations
provide for comprehensive and regular supervision and give state
agencies the power to demand correction of unanticipated
anticompetitive conduct,106 active supervision requires the State to
actually exercise this power.107 New York’s vague police power and
mixed political incentives raise questions about whether the
supervisory power will actually be exercised and whether the State
will tolerate abuses outside the immunity’s scope.108
B.

The COPA Statute and the Clear Articulation Requirement

Since New York’s COPA statute took effect on June 29, 2011,109
the Supreme Court has revisited the state action doctrine’s clear
articulation requirement. In FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems,
Inc.,110 the Court reviewed a Georgia statute that granted corporate
powers, including merger and acquisition abilities, to public hospital
authorities.111 The question considered was whether this power
enabled the hospital authorities to engage in mergers that would tend
to create monopolies otherwise prohibited by section 7112 of the
Clayton Act.113 The Court held that the state action doctrine did not
protect the hospital merger because the general grant of corporate
power did not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a policy to
permit mergers that would substantially lessen competition.114
Although a statute does not need to make the state’s desire to
displace competition explicit, the protected conduct must be clearly
expressed and the anticompetitive effect must be the foreseeable
result of the authorized conduct.115

106. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.1 to -1.16 (2018).
107. See Burget, 486 U.S. at 100–01.
108. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).
109. Id.
110. 568 U.S. 216 (2013).
111. See id. at 219–23.
112. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that tend
“substantially to lessen competition” or “create a monopoly.” Clayton Act § 7,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
113. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 219–24. The FTC also pursued its theory
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
114. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33.
115. See id. at 227.
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The COPA statute provides: “it shall be the policy of the state to
encourage, where appropriate, cooperative, collaborative and
integrative arrangements including but not limited to, mergers and
acquisitions among health care providers or among others who might
otherwise be competitors, under the active supervision of the
commissioner.”116 Further, in the event that these arrangements,
their planning, or their negotiation might be anticompetitive under
the federal or state antitrust laws, “the intent of the state is to
supplant competition with such arrangements under the active
supervision and related administrative actions of the commissioner as
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this article, and to provide
state action immunity under the state and federal antitrust laws.”117
As such, the COPA statute evinces the State’s desire to promote the
development of certain collaborative efficiencies at the expense of
protecting competition.
The statute’s language reflects the New York legislature’s intent to
create blanket immunity that protects virtually all collaborative
conduct that would violate the antitrust laws, so long as the relevant
state agencies approve. Similarly, the statute explicitly states the
legislature’s intent to “supplant” competition. In Phoebe Putney, the
Court stated that a legislature does not need to explicitly define the
specific ways in which it intends to supplant antitrust laws, as long as
anticompetitive conduct is the clear and logically foreseeable result of
the State’s directive.118 On the one hand, the COPA statute clearly
anticipates suppression of competition. On the other hand, its
references to types of conduct are vague and general. Further, any
contemplation of the prospective anticompetitive effects is also vague.
Based on the Court’s reasoning, it is most likely not enough for the
State to indicate that it wants to create blanket immunity, without
clearly articulating a policy that contravenes competition. The active
policy here is to improve Medicaid, and the statute does not shed any
light on what types of conduct the State will or will not tolerate, or
what will be considered an abuse outside the immunity’s scope.
Similarly, the statute does not specifically replace competition with an
opposing policy in the areas that will be most harmed by
anticompetitive conduct, such as private payor negotiations.119

116. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).
117. Id.
118. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33.
119. Compare N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa, with N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
§ 3405 (McKinney 2017). New York passed a state law after the Supreme Court
ruled in Phoebe Putney. The law’s text provides a more specific forecast of the
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In contrast to the claim of state action immunity reviewed in
Phoebe Putney, New York’s statute seems to insulate a wide range of
conduct, with an equally broad range of potentially anticompetitive
effects.120 Rather than point to specific entities deemed worthy of
immunity by the state legislature, the COPA statute delegates the
power to state agencies to decide on a case-by-case basis which
specific types of conduct will be blanketed with immunity.121
Although Phoebe Putney dealt with a specific set of powers that did
not include the ability to take anticompetitive action, the Court’s
holding suggests that the legislature’s articulation must be more
specific than what New York’s COPA statute provides.122
The lack of articulation can be seen by comparing the 2011 COPA
statute with section 3405 of the New York Public Authorities Law
(“Nassau Health statute”).123 Passed by the New York legislature in
2013 after Phoebe Putney was decided, this statute grants corporate
powers to the Nassau Health Care Corporation, a public hospital.124
The statute authorizes the entity to “engage in arrangements,
contracts, information sharing and other collaborative activities” that
“may have the effect of displacing competition in the provision of
hospital, physician, or other health care-related services.”125

specific hospital’s prospective corporate conduct and its likely anticompetitive effects.
See infra note 124.
120. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa.
121. See id.
122. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33.
123. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3405.
124. See id.
125. Id. In full, the relevant statutory text provides:
[T]he corporation is authorized to engage in arrangements, contracts,
information sharing and other collaborative activities with public or private
entities and individuals irrespective of the competitive consequences of
these activities and notwithstanding that these activities may have the effect
of displacing competition in the provision of hospital, physician, or other
health care-related services. These collaborative activities may include
without limitation: joint ventures; joint negotiations with physicians,
hospitals and payors, whether such negotiations result in separate or
combined agreements; leases; and/or agreements which involve delivery
system network creation and operation, provided that, the corporation shall
exercise state oversight by determining whether particular collaborations
with public or private entities and individuals further the interests of the
state as set forth in this subdivision and in subdivision three of section
thirty-four hundred one of this title. In undertaking these collaborative
activities, the corporation and the public or private entities and individuals
with which it collaborates shall be immunized from liability under the
federal and state antitrust laws.

Id.
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Unlike the COPA statute, the Nassau Health statute most likely
satisfies the clear articulation requirement, because it protects specific
conduct that it recognizes may have anticompetitive effects.126 The
legislature authorized a specific hospital system to engage in a
number of types of collaborative agreements, but does not limit
them.127 It also clarifies that the legislature foresees Nassau Health’s
collaborations being anticompetitive within the meaning of the
federal and state antitrust laws.128 Similarly, the statute lists specific
examples of anticompetitive conduct that might result, which includes
joint negotiations with physicians and private payors.129 The statute
also requires that Nassau Health consider whether potential
collaborations would further the State’s aims and file annual reports
that focus on information pertaining to any joint negotiations with
private payors.130 In sum, the Nassau Health statute permits a
specific entity to take potentially anticompetitive actions, indicates
that those actions will displace competition, forecasts a range of
anticompetitive effects, and reveals the State’s reasons for tolerating
these effects. As such, this statute provides a viable model for
meeting the clear articulation requirement after Phoebe Putney.131
In contrast, the COPA framework seems to accept an undefined
range of anticompetitive effects in the private market for the benefit
of Medicaid. While not every statute must necessarily provide the
precise level of detail contained in the Nassau Health statute, the
COPA statute clearly falls short of the minimum threshold.132 It
addresses neither the intended effects on private payment
negotiations nor potential market entrants. Similarly, because
reduced competition is part of the plan to improve Medicaid, rather
than the specific goal of the program itself, the COPA statute does
little to define the extent to which restraints of competition will be
tolerated.133 Because it lacks the specific contemplation as to the
form and effects of the conduct, and rather provides blanket
immunity for various types of conduct, the COPA statute does not

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See generally FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013).
Compare N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3405 (McKinney 2017), with N.Y. PUB.

HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).
133. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa.
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appear to conform to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Phoebe
Putney, and is not as likely constitute clear articulation.134
C.

The COPA Monitoring Regulations and the Active
Supervision Requirement

In addition to the clear articulation requirement, the state action
doctrine will also require a PPS to establish that its behavior was
actively supervised by the state.135 Whether New York’s regulatory
program will satisfy this requirement is unclear. The Supreme Court
has recognized that when private parties engage in anticompetitive
conduct pursuant to state policy, there is a real risk that the private
parties will “pursue their own self-interests under the guise of
implementing state policies.”136 To account for this risk, the state
action doctrine will only serve as a defense for a private party that can
prove the state monitored the challenged restraint to ensure that it
was consistent with state policy.137
This Section will consider the disposition of New York’s COPA
statute and the accompanying regulations under the active
supervision requirement. As with the clear articulation requirement,
New York’s COPA review and monitoring program appears to grant
the State both comprehensive review power and the meaningful
ability to correct any deviations from policy. However, the State is
also required to exercise this power.138 The State’s statutory standard
of review entails balancing the benefits and harms of the PPSs’
Although the regulations provide
anticompetitive conduct.139
examples
of
relevant
advantages
and
anticompetitive
disadvantages,140 they do not clearly address how heavily each of
these factors will be weighed in the State’s analysis. How these
standards will be applied is even less clear given the State’s mixed
incentives in reviewing PPS behavior. Additionally, failure to
adequately address potential antitrust concerns statutorily could
create problems correcting anticompetitive effects if they are found to

134. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 229.
135. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealer’s Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980).
136. Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 226 (citing Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47
(1985)).
137. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015).
138. See id. at 1116; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa.
139. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa.
140. See id.
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outweigh the benefits after the fact. This section will illustrate how
these problems might play out in several hypothetical scenarios.
The state action doctrine requires active supervision to ensure that
the state remains politically accountable for its policy.141 This
accountability is essential because, when a private party engages in
anticompetitive behavior with state permission, there is a real danger
that the party will use the immunity as cover to pursue its own private
interests.142 In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,143 the Supreme
Court opined that:
[T]he purpose of the active supervision inquiry is not to determine
whether the State has met some normative standard, such as
efficiency, in its regulatory practices. Its purpose is to determine
whether the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment
and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been
established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply
by agreement among private parties.144

The Court’s description of the standard for active supervision,
indicates that the State must exercise a high degree of control over
the anticompetitive conduct. Superficial or ineffective review and
supervision is insufficient.145
In Ticor, the Supreme Court considered whether the state action
defense applied to title insurance companies that had been charged
with price fixing fees for title searches.146 Arizona, Connecticut,
Montana, and Wisconsin authorized rate bureaus to set standard
prices charged by all of the member firms for the searches.147 The
firms negotiated a rate and submitted it to the respective states’
insurance offices, and this rate automatically took effect if the state
declined to reject it within a set period of time.148 The Court ruled
that the state action doctrine did not apply because the states’ passive
veto power over the rates did not amount to a specific inquiry into the
nature of the price fixing agreement, and therefore was not an
affirmative decision to condone it.149 The record indicated that the
state insurance agency generally only checked the filings for

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.
See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).
504 U.S. 621 (1992).

Id. at 634–35.
See id.
See id. at 634.
See id. at 628.
See id. at 629.
See id. at 634–35.
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mathematical accuracy, and often did not review them or their
competitive ramifications at all.150 This oversight was insufficient
because it lacked the political accountability that the state action
doctrine requires.151 The principles of federalism underlying the state
action doctrine require that states maintain and “exercise power to
review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disprove
those that fail to accord with state policy.”152 Therefore, “[t]he
question is not how well state regulation works, but whether the
anticompetitive scheme is the State’s own.”153 Under Ticor, it is most
likely not enough that a state policy provides for passive monitoring
in cases where the State government lacks the incentive to remain
active in monitoring the anticompetitive conduct.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly identified elements
that will substantiate active supervision, the FTC has identified
factors it views as indicators of sufficient monitoring. According to
the agency, a well-developed factual record including adequate notice
and the opportunity for public comment, a written decision on the
restraint’s merits, and a specific quantitative and qualitative
assessment of the restraint’s relationship to the state legislature’s
standards tend to reflect the fact that the state sufficiently examined
and monitored the conduct.154 While these factors may provide a
good view of the State’s involvement in the questioned restraint, they
are ultimately procedural in nature and are not necessarily
synonymous with active supervision.
On their face, the COPA regulations and their underlying statute
provide for the comprehensive monitoring and control of PPS
behavior.
All COPA applications will be reviewed by the
Department of Health, in consultation with the Attorney General and
the Health Planning Counsel.155 The review process involves
weighing the potential benefits of the proposed collaboration against
the potential restraints of competition.156 Factors the State considers
include the participants’ financial condition, the relevant market

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 638.
See id. at 636.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 635.
See TODD J. ZYWICKI ET AL., OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE

STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 55 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/report-state-action-task-force-recommendations-clarify-andreaffirm-original-purposes-state-action/stateactionreport_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6V5N-5SHX].
155. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.5 (2018).
156. See id.
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dynamics, the likelihood of decreased competition, and adverse
effects on payors’ ability to negotiate rates.157
Each COPA
application can be made contingent on certain protective provisions
that can theoretically lessen the anticompetitive effects of the
collaboration.158 After the State grants COPA status, the PPS’s
conduct is regularly reviewed according to these terms as well as its
DSRIP performance metrics.159 If, upon review, a PPS is found to not
comply the COPA conditions, a PPS is found to have leveraged its
market power beyond the State’s intended scope, or a PPS’s
anticompetitive effects outweigh its benefits, the Attorney General
may demand that corrective measures be taken.160 If the PPS fails to
comply, the Attorney General may withdraw the immunity and
pursue an antitrust action.161 These regulations provide for regular
monitoring of the PPS behavior, and provide some level of state
control.162
Although the COPA statute purports to supplant competition and
provide immunity, its focus is on Medicaid, a part of the health system
that is ancillary to the competitive landscape. Medicaid payments are
determined according to government policy, rather than through
bargaining by consumers or payors.163 The COPA framework does
not specifically address the parts of the system that competition is
thought to protect. However, the structure of the COPA statute
implies that it means to permit potentially anticompetitive conduct in
the private market, for the benefit of efficiencies in the closed
Medicaid market.164 The State’s power to monitor and intervene in
the conduct will not necessarily constitute active supervision because
the standards of review on which it relies are vague.165 The
regulations specify that increased costs and prices, diminished quality
or availability of care, reduced competition, and the inability of health
care payors to negotiate rates are among the results that will be
considered disadvantages.166 However, they do not lay out clearly
defined standards for what will and will not trigger a withdrawal of

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id.
See id. § 83-1.6.
See id. § 83-1.10.
See id.
See id. § 83-1.12(c).
See generally id. § 83-1.4.
See Schneider & Wachino, supra note 5, 131–33.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.2 (2018).
See generally id. § 83-1.5.
See id. § 83-1.5(d).
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immunity.167 Specifically, the procedure of evaluating whether the
“benefits . . . no longer outweigh the disadvantages” of the
collaboration, sheds little light on what the State’s tolerance for
anticompetitive behavior is.168 In the context of negotiations with
private payors, the case-by-case basis review may be inconsistent.169
In addition to vague review standards, the regulatory program may
lack the tools to intervene and control specific anticompetitive effects
without fully withdrawing immunity. Unanticipated anticompetitive
effects might stem from elements of the collaboration that cannot be
fixed without muting the desired efficiencies, and the State lacks the
statutory or regulatory power to intervene and mitigate the
problematic conduct. For example, if a PPS’s negotiations with
private payors result in higher prices, neither the COPA statute nor
the regulations provide a mechanism for New York’s Department of
Health or Attorney General’s Office to take control of the
negotiations or enforce more appropriate rates. The State can only
demand changes that might not be easily complied with if the unfair
negotiations are directly attributable to the health care providers’
bargaining position as a single identity under a PPS.
If the State’s demands are not met, its chief recourse is to withdraw
the immunity and mount an antitrust challenge.170 However, the
State might have mixed incentives that prevent it from exercising this
option. On the one hand, New York’s agreement with the U.S.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services makes the amount of
federal funding awarded contingent on the State meeting overall cost
reduction benchmarks.171 This gives the State an incentive to closely
monitor and police PPS performance and conduct. If it condones
overly anticompetitive conduct, the PPS might be able to generate
greater costs, raise prices, or reduce quality, all of which would harm
the State’s overall performance. On the other hand, New York’s
application of the COPA law to the DSRIP Program encourages
PPSs to pursue the State’s health care reform policy aggressively. If
the State weighs disadvantages heavily and makes aggressive
demands on participants or alternatively strips the immunity and
mounts antitrust challenges, it could devalue the COPA statute as an
incentive to pursue efficiencies. This could, in turn, prevent other

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. § 83-1.10(b).
Id.
See id.
See id. § 83-1.12.
See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 28, at 54–55.
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institutions from pursuing the efficiencies the State is ultimately
seeking.
Anticompetitive effects may be more challenging and costly to
correct after-the fact. Rather than controlling a specific type of
conduct, the process of weighing advantages against anticompetitive
disadvantages amounts to replacement of federal antitrust review
with the State’s own review. The danger here is that the State could
permit prospective collaboration and integration that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws, and decide later that the
immunity should not apply because the disadvantages outweigh the
advantages. Since the State does not have the ability to take control
of a specific restraint, remedying the situation could possibly require
undoing collaboration, which could be even more damaging to the
health care system in the area than the anticompetitive conduct is. In
this case, the State would benefit from the ability to control the
conduct, rather than adjust it by way of an antitrust claim.
The essence of the active supervision requirement is to ensure that
private entities do not use state policy as a pretext for pursuing their
own interests.172 The danger posed by the COPA program is that a
PPS might gain immunity and function as an anticompetitive agent,
rather than produce the State’s desired efficiencies. The New York
Department of Health’s procedure of weighing the benefits of the
conduct against the harms is vague, and provides little guidance about
what circumstances will be found contrary to the State’s policy.
Further, the State might not have the necessary incentives to actively
exercise its police power because doing so could do more harm than
good.
The following sections illustrate these issues in the context of
hypothetical examples. Section III.C.1 examines possible issues that
could arise if an immunized PPS pursues a merger in a highly
consolidated market. Section II.C.2 similarly discusses the antitrust
problems that could arise when competing hospitals clinically and
financially integrate.

1.

DSRIP-PPS Merger Scenario

The problems with the COPA framework’s vaguely articulated
supervision standards come to light in the merger context. Assume
that two hospitals exist in a narrow geographic market that serves a
substantial number of Medicaid beneficiaries, and they are the only
two hospitals in the area. Independently, the two hospitals have a
172. See supra Section III.B.
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variety of facilities, but each has capabilities that the other does not.
Suppose further that one of the hospitals is consistently underutilized,
while the other’s resources are constantly spread too thin. These
hospitals might be prime candidates to form a PPS under New York’s
DSRIP policy.
However, their merger would constitute a two-to-one consolidation
that would create a monopoly in the geographic market, which is
ordinarily problematic for antitrust purposes. After consummation of
the merger, the surviving entity would be the sole negotiator with
third-party payors.173 State regulators would be faced with a tough
decision. A merger might produce the greatest possible efficiencies,
and could generate substantial Medicaid savings. Given its obvious
anticompetitive ramifications, State policy dictates that this
prospective PPS would need COPA protection to merge.174 If the
collaboration is approved and COPA immunity is granted, and the
entities are able to merge without any additional scrutiny from the
antitrust agencies, they would begin to integrate immediately, and
consolidate into one entity with a single corporate identity, as well as
unified financial and medical operations.
If the merger occurred, the newly merged PPS would regularly
report on the progress of the integration and its attempts to generate
efficiency. If the merger went as planned, the integration would
result in allocation of patients and services between facilities, sharing
of patient information, and allocation of financial resources. If this
resulted in lowering costs attributable to Medicaid, it would be a
success in the eyes of the State. However, if the reports indicated that
efficiencies had been generated, and costs to Medicaid had dropped,
but the prices charged to insurers either remained the same or
increased, the overall value of the integration would be much less
clear. State regulators would be forced to balance the value of the
integration against the anticompetitive harms.
If the merged entity does produce efficiencies, and can generally
meet patient demand in the area, it could deter other possible
providers from establishing hospitals in the area.
If the
anticompetitive restraints on trade become severe enough to warrant
the withdrawal of immunity, the next step would likely be to undo the
merger. To do so would be problematic for the State because it
would cancel the efficient benefits.
Moreover, requiring
disintegration of the merger would be complicated and would likely

173. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.1(c) (2018).
174. See supra Section III.B.
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damage the remaining entities’ ability to provide quality health care
in the area. The DOJ and FTC premerger notification process is,
itself, predicated on the idea that it may be too challenging or
damaging to the merged entities to undo a merger once it has been
completed.175 This scenario illustrates that the State’s framework for
monitoring and evaluating potential collaborations also entails
weighing the costs of correcting unforeseen anticompetitive conduct,
which might deter the State from exercising the extent of its power.
As a result, this hypothetical would most likely not satisfy the active
supervision requirements of state action immunity.

2.

DSRIP-PPS Clinical and Financial Integration Scenario

Another problem with New York’s active supervision framework is
its apparent lack of competition-specific review standards. The
DSRIP Program assumes that promoting collaboration will create
efficiencies, and these efficiencies will benefit Medicaid and private
payors alike.176 This assumption underlies the State’s ultimate goal to
have PPSs function as completely integrated systems with a single
identity.177 Private sector insurance plans have cited concerns that in
certain cases, this will guarantee monopolistic or oligopolistic
behavior.178 Analysis of a project’s competitive advantages and
disadvantages, including the balance of bargaining power with private
payors, is only one of the factors weighed in COPA review. The
regulations do not clarify how these values will be weighed, and it is
therefore unclear whether the review program does or can amount to
active supervision of the PPS’s effects on the competitive landscape.
For example, take the hypothetical PPS discussed in Section II.C.1.
Assume that, rather than merging, the two hospitals enter into a
comprehensive cooperative agreement that encompasses care
delivery, personnel, IT services, accounting, and other internal
services, all of which would be integrated to function seamlessly.179

175. See PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE, FTC, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE I:
WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? 1 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J69L-PRVP].
176. See Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24.
177. See id.
178. See Letter from the N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
et al., to Tara Isa Koslov, Deputy Dir., FTC Office of Planning & Peter J. Mucchetti,
Chief, Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://originstates.politico.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/NYS%20DSRIP%20
FTC%20DOJ%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKN2-JGPR].
179. See id.
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To comply with COPA conditions intended to protect fairness in
private payor negotiations, state regulators may require that the PPS
incorporate internal safeguards to maintain the separate identity of
each institution.180 In theory, this would preserve fairness in private
negotiations.
Maintaining meaningful separation for the sole purpose of private
negotiations seems unrealistic where the entities reach complete
integration. Even if negotiations are carried out independently, it will
be hard to separate the individual entities from the whole. The
pooling of operational information is one of the key aspects of New
York’s integration policy.181 The DSRIP framework envisions that
PPS participants share usage information so that they can allocate
and streamline their services.182 Even if this information is not
directly related to private price negotiations, it is inherently related to
the competitive dynamic between the two hospitals. Therefore, it will
be nearly impossible for the two hospitals to retain separate identities
for negotiation purposes.
The COPA statute purports to eliminate private causes of action
for antitrust violations, leaving private payors that perceive unfairness
in the negotiating process with limited options.183 The only real
possibility is to complain to the New York Attorney General. The
State is then faced with deciding how to weigh the complaint. If the
PPS otherwise creates efficiencies that improve quality and lower
overall costs, the State may not be inclined to intervene, since
intervention could risk disruption of the efficiency-driven progress.
All of this underscores a potential failure in the State’s supervision.
The regulations do not clearly provide protection for third-party
payors or a competition-focused means of policing negotiations. The
extent to which the immunity extends to interactions outside the
relationship with Medicaid is not clear. Similarly, it is not clear how
the identities of otherwise integrated providers can be meaningfully
differentiated. The State’s supervision does not reach individual
negotiations with private payors, and the exercise of regulatory power
to monitor and police them likely hinders the State’s underlying
purpose of generating efficiencies.

180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
See id.
See id.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Judicial precedent applying the state action doctrine emphasizes its
roots in the principles of federalism, and clarifies that the antitrust
laws do not interfere with a State’s rights to regulate economies and
markets within its borders.184 However, the doctrine also requires
that when a State chooses to supplant competition in favor of its own
regulatory policy that permits private anticompetitive conduct, the
State must maintain full legal accountability for the behavior it
condones.185 New York’s DSRIP Program and COPA immunity
framework reflect its intent to foster collaboration in the health care
system at the expense of healthy competition.186 Nevertheless, it is
not clear that the State retains the level of accountability that the
state action doctrine requires. There are several approaches the State
might take to resolve these potential problems. First, efforts to make
both the statute and the applicable regulations more specific in terms
of the forms of anticompetitive conduct and effects the legislature
intends for PPSs to engage in will improve COPA’s position under
the clear articulation requirement. Second, amending the statute and
regulations to clarify the State’s review standards and intervention
powers will make it more likely that the grant of immunity will
withstand scrutiny in light of the active supervision requirement.
As previously discussed, one of the principal problems with New
York’s COPA regime is that, if upheld, it effectively sidelines federal
antitrust review. Without federal regulation, the State is left to its
own devices to decide where and when it wants to supplant
competition. While state action jurisprudence permits states to do so,
New York’s policy is broadly cast in its terms, reflecting the state
legislature’s intent to grant blanket immunity for a variety of
anticompetitive behavior in discrete circumstances. Similarly, the
State has a nondescript monitoring policy and limited power and
incentive to intervene if the immunized behavior strays from the
intended scope.187 Because of these possible shortcomings, it is not
clear that the COPA program constitutes either clear articulation or
active supervision.
There are a number of steps the New York legislature and the
relevant state agencies can take to reinforce their immunity grants
under the Supreme Court’s guidance on the state action doctrine.

184.
185.
186.
187.

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943).
See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992).
See Evans, supra note 9.
See supra Sections III.B, III.C.

2018]

COLLABORATION IN HEALTH CARE

905

The New York legislature should amend the COPA statute to more
clearly articulate and affirmatively express the State’s policy to
displace competition and provide clearer guidance on the State’s role
as an active supervisor. Revisions may also be made to the COPA
regulations to clarify the State’s supervision standards and provide
more corrective power short of withdrawal of immunity. Further,
State lawmakers should consult the agencies regarding planned
revisions. This Part describes these possibilities in more detail.
As discussed above, New York’s COPA statute casts its desired
immunity broadly in an attempt to immunize a wide range of conduct
with an equally wide range of possibly anticompetitive effects. It is
unlikely that this attempt to provide blanket immunity will constitute
clear articulation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Phoebe
Putney.188 In contrast, New York’s subsequently passed Nassau
Health immunity statute is far more specific in its terms. Given the
scope of the DSRIP Program, which is meant to reach every general
health care provider that accepts Medicaid patients, it is not feasible
for the New York legislature to pass an individual statute for every
institution it seeks to protect. However, the New York legislature
could amend the current statute to make certain terms more specific.
For example, the legislature could identify the specific ways that
displacement of competition could permissibly affect the health care
system. This could include clear indication that the legislature intends
for COPA protected entities to negotiate as a single unit with private
payors, and provide for a price control mechanism to prevent abuse
of increased bargaining power. If the legislature can amend the
statute to be more specific in the terms of the immunized conduct and
its potential effects, it will be clearer whether the immunity applies in
a given set of circumstances. Similarly, the fact that the COPA
statute pertains to a broad range of PPS collaborations might be
offset by incorporating more decisive statutory directives to the New
York Department of Health and the State Attorney General about
which collaborations should be immune. These types of changes
would provide a clearer articulation of New York’s intent to supplant
competition.
The clear articulation requirement is closely related to the active
supervision requirement. “Both are directed at ensuring that
particular anticompetitive mechanisms operate because of a
deliberate and intended state policy.”189 Because of this close

188. See generally FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013).
189. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
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relationship, the state legislature should also amend the COPA
statute to strengthen the State’s position under the state action
doctrine’s active supervision prong.
The active supervision
requirement relies just as much on the monitoring procedures in place
as it does on the State’s actual application of those procedures.190
The State will need to diligently exercise whatever regulatory system
is in place. However, including guiding thresholds for what the
permissible anticompetitive boundaries are could improve the New
York Department of Health’s ability to weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of a given PPS collaboration.
Moreover, the Department of Health could also amend the
accompanying COPA regulations to clearly delineate how different
factors are weighed upon review.
At the moment, the
anticompetitive permissions granted by the State are pointed at
Medicaid, a separate part of New York’s health care system.191 The
Department of Health should clarify how the interests of the private
market weigh in terms of the State’s tolerance for reduced
competition. This will help inform market participants about exactly
what the State’s policy is—and when a collaboration has strayed
from it.
Along the same lines, the Department of Health could amend the
regulations regarding the setting of custom terms for each COPA
awarded. It follows that these custom terms would be tailored to
quell the anticompetitive effects of each given situation. If the agency
were to, in addition, provide generally applicable rules, it would
reflect a higher degree of state control over the conduct. For
example, some of the PPS specific terms might apply to how price
negotiations are carried out with private payors. Application of
general rules would set clearer limits on the range of permissible
collaborative conduct.
The state legislature and Department of Health should also amend
the statute and regulations to provide the State with more
intermediate corrective power. At the moment, the law only provides
the state agencies with the ability to demand correction of certain
conduct, and, if these demands prove ineffective, withdraw COPA
status and pursue an antitrust challenge.192 The lack of intermediate
power presents the State with a supervision problem.193 The
190. See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
191. See supra Part III.
192. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.10 (2018); see also discussion
supra Section III.C.
193. See supra Section III.B.
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withdrawal of immunity and pursuit of a challenge is an aggressive
option that risks devaluing the immunity as a means of promoting
State reform policy. If the State had more intermediate power to step
in and take control of the anticompetitive conduct, and subdue the
anticompetitive effects, it could maintain immunity as a viable option,
while still promoting its underlying reform policy.
The State would also be wise to consult with the FTC and the DOJ
about any changes to the policy it is considering. If the State can
incorporate agency input into the potential reforms, the odds that the
Agencies will challenge the immunity decrease, and the odds that the
immunity serves to protect the State’s reform policy increase.
CONCLUSION
Health care reform has been one of the defining issues in the
national political landscape for over two decades. Although there is
contentious disagreement over how we should view the health care
system and how it should function, few disagree with the idea that the
constantly rising costs of care need to be curbed, especially since the
increased costs do not correspond to any particular improvement in
the quality of care provided. This conversation took a sharp turn
when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted.
Amongst its many goals, the ACA aimed to reduce health care costs
by encouraging providers to collaborate, sharing resources,
information, and expertise to provide higher quality care at lower
costs. As in any market, however, collaboration among competitors
can conflict with the federal antitrust laws. New York has focused on
improving its Medicaid program in the hopes of ensuring greater
access to improved health care to the state’s low-income citizens. The
application of New York’s Certificate of Public Advantage statute to
this effort reflects the State’s desire to encourage health care
providers to aggressively pursue efficiencies without fear of antitrust
enforcement. This move implicates the state action doctrine, which
revolves around the fundamental balance between individual states’
rights to regulate their own markets, and the prevailing national
policy to protect competition. However, it is not clear whether New
York’s attempt to invoke state action immunity comports with the
Supreme Court’s most recent rulings on the subject, which have
clarified and arguably raised its requirements.
Although the Certificate of Public Advantage statute makes the
State’s intentions to provide blanket immunity clear, the state action
doctrine’s clear articulation prong requires a more specific
contemplation of the manner and scope of the anticompetitive
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conduct being condoned. Similarly, the doctrine’s active supervision
prong requires that the State both have and exercise the power to
actively supervise the specific anticompetitive conduct. Efforts to
make both the statute and the accompanying regulatory regime more
specific as to what types of anticompetitive conduct and effects the
legislature is willing to condone will better support a finding of clear
articulation. Further, amending the statute and regulations to clarify
the State’s review standards and increasing its intervention power will
support the finding that the State controlled the conduct and ensured
that the providers acted in accordance with the State’s overriding
policy objectives.

